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APPLYING COPYRIGHT ABANDONMENT  
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
MATTHEW W. TURETZKY1 
ABSTRACT 
Copyright law protects orphan and parented works equally—
but it shouldn’t. Consequently, current law unnecessarily restrains 
public access to works that authors have not exercised dominion 
over for decades. 
This problem has come to the fore in the Google Books 
settlement, which critics argue will give Google a de facto 
monopoly over orphan works. But this criticism implicates an 
obvious question: Why are orphan works protected by copyright 
law in the first place? If orphan works were in the public domain, 
then no one would worry about Google’s supposed “monopoly” 
because Google’s competitors would be free to copy the works 
without facing class action lawsuits.  
To address these concerns, I propose a new equitable defense 
to copyright infringement: the orphan theory of abandonment.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 “In 1996, Google co-founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page were 
graduate computer science students working on a research project supported 
by the Stanford Digital Library Technologies Project. Their goal was to 
make digital libraries work . . . .”2 To accomplish this, Brin and Page 
developed BackRub, a program which would allow users to determine the 
relevance of certain books by calculating the number of times a work is 
cited.3 What they learned in the process ultimately “inspired Google’s 
PageRank algorithms—the core search technology that makes Google, well, 
Google.”4 
                                                      
1 Editor-in-Chief, Duke Law and Technology Review; J.D. Expected, 2011, 
Duke University School of Law; B.S., 2008, University of Florida. I am 
sincerely grateful to my colleagues at the Duke Law and Technology Review for 
their assistance with this iBrief.  
2 History of Google Books, GOOGLE BOOKS, 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/history.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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¶2 In 2002, Google launched a secret books project5 with an ambitious 
goal of digitizing every book ever written. This is no easy task; it takes forty 
minutes to digitize just one 300-page volume.6 After Mary Sue Coleman, 
president of the University of Michigan, informed Page it would take nearly 
one thousand years to scan the university’s seven million volumes, he 
nevertheless told her “Google can help make it happen in six.”7  
¶3 Google successfully created a digital library, but not without 
opposition. In 2005, publishers and authors of digitized works sued Google 
in a class action copyright infringement suit.8 Recently, this suit was settled 
and is awaiting judicial approval.9 Under the settlement, Google will retain 
thirty-seven percent of the revenue generated by Google Books. The 
remaining sixty-three percent will go to a “Book Rights Registry, run by 
authors and publishers, to administer rights and distribute payments.”10  
¶4 Much of the controversy in the Google Books case revolves around 
the status of so-called orphan works. Orphan works are—as the name 
suggests—works without an identifiable copyright owner. Without their 
copyright owner identified, libraries and book stores cannot negotiate 
distribution deals, relegating these works to remain “lost in the bowels of a 
few great libraries.”11 The Google Books settlement will make these works 
available to the public unless the copyright owner demands their removal 
from the database. This benefits society by bringing a vast wealth of 
knowledge to the internet-surfing public.12  
¶5 Despite this benefit, the Google Books settlement remains 
controversial.13 There is a growing concern that the settlement vests a 




8 See Complaint, The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-08136 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005); Complaint, McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Google, Inc., No. 
1:05-CV-08881 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005).  
9 Settlement is awaiting judicial approval as of March 15, 2010. Google has 
published the 141 page settlement agreement on its website. 
http://books.google.com/booksrightsholders/Settlement-Agreement.pdf.  
10 Miguel Helft, Some Raise Alarms as Google Resurrects Out-of-Print Books, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/04/technology/internet/04books.html?_r=1. 
11 Id. 
12 See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND, 221 (2008) (discussing the orphan works problem), available at 
http://thepublicdomain.org/thepublicdomain1.pdf. The orphan works problem 
has been studied extensively by Professor Boyle. His analysis and insight is far 
beyond the scope of this iBrief. See id. at 253 n.8.  
13 Miguel Helft & Motoko Rich, Lawyer and Author Adds His Objections to 
Settling the Google Book Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, at B2, available 
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virtual monopoly to Google over orphan works.14 “Since no authorization is 
possible for orphan works, only Google would have access to them, so only 
Google could assemble a truly comprehensive book database.”15 
Additionally, the barriers to entry (e.g., building an online library like 
Google Books) are high enough to foreclose any realistic possibility of 
competition.  
¶6 Of course, monopolization would not be an issue if orphan works 
were already in the public domain. Because the works are still protected by 
copyright, potential competitors cannot copy Google Books’ digital copy of 
orphan material without infringing on the orphan author’s copyright. Much 
like Google, the second comer who creates an online library to compete 
with Google Books will likely be subject to a class action copyright 
infringement suit of its own. In other words, the Google Books settlement 
waives only the infringement claims against Google, not its potential 
competitors. Thus, many are concerned that the Google Books settlement 
simply trades one monopoly for another. 
¶7 Further complicating the issue is the relationship between 
copyright’s limitations and the orphan works problem.  One such limitation, 
which is constitutionally mandated, is that copyrights last for a “limited 
time.”16 Another limitation is the constitutionally acknowledged purpose of 
copyright and patent law “to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”17 One possible interpretation of this limitation is that Congress 
exceeds its constitutional authority under the Copyright Clause when it 
grants copyrights to works that do not “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”18 Defenses like fair use19 and abandonment function as 
additional safeguards against Congress’s copyright powers.20  
                                                                                                                         
at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/technology/internet/19google.html?_r=2&
hpw (Scott E. Gant of Boies Schiller describes the settlement as providing 
Google with the commercial rights to millions of books without having to 
negotiate for them individually).  
14 Id.  
15 Helft, supra note 10.  
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Of course, after Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
221–22 (2003) (holding that the Copyright Term Extension Act satisfies the 
limited times clause by extending the duration of copyright to 95 years), it is not 
clear what—if anything—the limited times clause really limits.  
17 Id. 
18 See id. 
19 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (fair-use defense codified in the Copyright Act). 
20 See Robert A. Kreiss, Abandoning Copyrights to Try to Cut Off Termination 
Rights, 58 MO. L. REV. 85, 92 n.24 (1993) (citing numerous cases recognizing 
abandonment as a valid defense to copyright infringement). 
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¶8 Because orphan works are remarkably similar to works found in the 
public domain, I argue that a new theory of abandonment should provide an 
affirmative defense to copyright infringement. This theory would provide a 
basis for declaratory relief to good-faith infringers who are willing to 
compensate lost authors, but need judicial assurance that their behavior is 
non-infringing in order to compete in the market dominated by Google 
Books. 
I. THE DIVERGENCE OF LAW AND POLICY AFTER BERNE 
¶9 The simplest policy argument in favor of strong intellectual 
property rights comes from intellectual property’s non-rivalrous and non-
excludable character.21 Intellectual property rights are nevertheless limited 
by (1) restrictions imposed by the policies behind traditional property law, 
(2) restrictions imposed by the Constitution (e.g., the First Amendment) and 
other statutes (e.g., the Sherman Act), and (3) the notion that all intellectual 
property belongs to the public domain by default. These limitations are 
incorporated into many of the affirmative defenses to copyright 
infringement. In addition to balancing domestic policy concerns, copyright 
law must also respond to the obligations of international treaties. This 
section explains how American law has lost touch with the policy goals it 
purports to advance.  
¶10 In simple terms, the “divergence of law and policy” occurred when 
the Berne Convention abolished copyright law’s notice requirement. Indeed, 
the lack of a notice requirement in America’s copyright regime is the 
primary reason for the orphan works problem. 
A. The Notice Requirement 
¶11 In the late 1980s, a cacophony of criticism was brewing in the 
United States over the country’s 100-year abstinence from the Berne 
Convention. On April 21, 1988, Senator Patrick Leahy published an op-ed 
in the New York Times arguing that ratification of the Berne Convention 
was necessary to “earn[] a voice and a veto when the world’s copyright 
community convenes to respond to new technological advances.”22 Later 
that year, the “modest changes”23 described by Leahy were enacted when 
the United States Senate passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act 
of 1988 (“BCIA”) and joined the Berne Convention.24 
                                                      
21 See BOYLE, supra note 12, at 3. 
22 Senator Patrick J. Leahy, How to Protect [Copyright] In World Markets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1988, at A31.  
23 Id. 
24 Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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¶12 Prior to the BCIA, federal law “required notice of copyright for all 
publicly distributed copies of a work of authorship.”25 Historically, the 
United States was the only major country where notice was a prerequisite to 
protection.26 Failure to comply with the notice requirement would result in 
forfeiture of copyright.27 In order to satisfy the notice requirement prior to 
the BCIA’s implementation, an author had to satisfy the following three 
elements: (1) Physical affixation of the symbol “©,” the abbreviation 
“Copr.,” or the word “Copyright” on  the work itself; (2) the name of the 
copyright owner; and (3) the date of first publication.28 The notice 
provisions “gave rise to substantial litigation and led to a whole body of 
law” over legal formalisms.29  
¶13 Proponents of the notice requirement justify it thusly: First, “it 
places into the public domain works in which no one has an interest in 
maintaining copyright.”30 Second, it “informs the public of a claim for 
copyright.”31 Finally, it identifies the date of the first publication.32  
¶14 Critics point to three instances wherein notice fails to inform the 
public of when the copyrighted work will lapse into the public domain.33 
Indeed, this would be impossible to know at the time of publication, 
because the work falls into the public domain seventy years after the 
author’s death; under current law, the date of publication simply does not 
factor into the equation.34 Notice also will not reflect subsequent changes in 
copyright ownership35 and does not need—in the case of derivative works—
to identify the original work!36  Therefore, while notice can be helpful, “it is 
far more useful to investigate registration records.”37  
                                                      
25 MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 161 (4th ed. 2005) 
(Matthew Bender & Co.). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at n.76 (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.02 (2005)).  
28 17 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1978). 
29 Thomas P. Arden, The Questionable Utility of Copyright Notice: Statutory 
and Nonlegal Incentives in the Post-Berne Era, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 261–
63 (1993).  
30 LEAFFER, supra note 26, at 162.  
31 Id. 
32 Arden, supra note 30, at 267. This is no longer important because the date of 
publication no longer triggers copyright protection. Under the pre-1976 regime, 
an individual familiar with copyright law could use the date of publication to 
determine when the work passes into the public domain. Id. 
33 Id. at 267–68.  
34 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 
Stat. 2827 (1998).  
35 Arden, supra note 30, at 268. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. (citations omitted).  
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¶15 But registration records are “only as good as the information 
reflected in [them].”38 The absence of a record does not mean that the work 
is unprotected39 because “copyright registration is essentially voluntary, and 
many copyright owners choose not to register.”40 Nevertheless, because 
registration is a prerequisite to suit, it remains a very important element of 
copyright protection.41 At one point, 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) “required 
recordation of a transfer of an interest in copyright in order to bring an 
infringement suit.”42 The orphan works problem would have never existed 
under this rule because Google would have easily been able to find the 
copyright owners of most works. Unfortunately, the damage done by the 
BCIA—which abrogated this rule—is more than a decade old.43 Even if the 
old rule was reinstituted, there would still be millions of orphan works 
whose copyright ownership has already been transferred without 
recordation.  
¶16 In sum, registration does little to alleviate the damage caused by the 
BCIA. Although it is a prerequisite to suit, registration is not a prerequisite 
to negotiation. Without the Google Books settlement, Google might be sued 
by the copyright owner of an orphan work decades into the future, even 
though Google is ready and willing to negotiate a license today. The 
alternative—that Google should not publish orphan works, and instead, 
allow them to lie comatose in “the bowels of a few great libraries” 44—is 
unfathomable. The purpose of copyright is to “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts,”45 not to protect the rights of those unconcerned 
with the exercise thereof.  
B. The Obsolescence of the Contemporary Equitable Defenses After 
the United States’ Entrance to the Berne Convention 
¶17 Orphan works cannot be accessed or distributed by anyone without 
permission from the long-lost copyright owner. This is the orphan works 
problem. If the copyright owner of a work cannot be found, then the public 
cannot possibly know with much certainty when the owner’s work will 
divest to the public domain.46   
                                                      
38 LEAFFER, supra note 26, at 274.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 281 n.17.  
43 Id. 
44 Helft, supra note 10.  
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
46 See BOYLE, supra note 12, at 21 (summarizing Thomas Jefferson’s argument 
that “intellectual property rights are not and should not be permanent; in fact 
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¶18 There are several defenses that Google could raise in a potential 
infringement suit brought by the copyright owner of an orphan work. The 
most obvious include the statute of limitations, forfeiture, abandonment, 
and the fair use defense. Unfortunately, none of these defenses are relevant 
to the Google Books case; nor would they be successful in any potential 
infringement suit. They are nevertheless relevant because their limitations 
contextualize why an orphan works abandonment defense is needed in the 
first place. 
¶19 One of the most obvious defenses to infringement is the three-year 
statute of limitations.47 Exactly when that three-year period begins, 
however, is obfuscated by variances in judicial interpretation. One line of 
cases treats each act of infringement separately and only bars those more 
than three years old.48 The other line employs a “continuing infringement” 
theory that treats the individual infringing acts as a single cause of action 
for infringement.49 In these cases, the statutory period runs from the time of 
the last infringing act.50 Under either theory, however, Google could not 
mount a successful statute of limitations defense because Google infringes 
every time a user accesses copyrighted material on Google Books. In other 
words, Google is always infringing because someone is always accessing 
copyrighted content on Google Books.     
¶20 Fair use is also unavailing. In Google’s case, the use is commercial, 
which is enough to establish a presumption against fair use.51 While other 
equitable considerations could help overcome this presumption, a court 
would likely hold that Google’s dominant market position precludes the 
fair-use defense.52 As one court put it, “[t]he fair use doctrine is not a 
                                                                                                                         
they should be tightly limited in time and should not last a day longer than 
necessary to encourage the innovation in the first place.”). 
47 17 U.S.C. § 507 (2006).  
48 LEAFFER, supra note 26, at 516 n.210 (citing Makedwe Publ’g Co. v. Johnson, 
37 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 1994); Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479 
(9th Cir. 1994); Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
508 U.S. 906 (1993); Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976)).  
49 According to Leaffer, the leading case on this is Judge Posner’s opinion in 
Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983). LAEFFER, supra note 26, at 
515.  
50 Id. at n.209 (citing Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(“The initial copying was not a separate and completed wrong but simply the 
first step in a course of wrongful conduct that continued till the last copy of the 
infringing map was sold . . . .”)). 
51 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 
(1984) (commercial use establishes a presumption of market harm).  
52 Helft, supra note 10 (“‘No other company can realistically get an equivalent 
license,’ said Pamela Samuelson.”).   
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license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright 
whenever it determines the underlying work contains material of possible 
public importance.”53  
¶21 Abandonment and forfeiture provide additional defenses to 
copyright infringement. Abandonment is a complete defense because, if 
successfully interposed, it refutes the plaintiff’s claim of ownership.54 
Successfully asserting the abandonment defense therefore places the 
abandoned work in the public domain.55 Forfeiture is less relevant in 
modern cases because it only occurs when a copyright owner fails to 
comply with the notice requirement.56 Unlike abandonment, proving 
forfeiture does not require a showing of intent.57 Forfeiture is irrelevant to 
the orphan works problem because the BCIA eliminates the notice 
requirement.58 Abandonment’s justifications, however, are extremely 
relevant.  
¶22 Proving that a copyright owner abandoned his copyright is a rather 
onerous process. To establish that a copyright was abandoned, a defendant 
must show (1) that the plaintiff intended to surrender rights in his or her 
work; and (2) that the plaintiff committed some overt act showing this 
intent.59 These elements are difficult to prove: even if a copyright owner 
loses interest in extracting value from a work—as is generally the case with 
orphan works—it is unlikely that the copyright owner will surrender the 
right to extract value for nothing in return. Accordingly, very few works are 
abandoned.  
¶23 Thus, no current doctrine enables the public to access the vast body 
of human knowledge contained within orphaned intellectual property.60 I 
                                                      
53 Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 
(2d Cir. 1980).  
54 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: 
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of 
Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 320–21 (2007). 
55 Id. at 320. 
56 See Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. 191 F.2d 594, 597–98 
(2d Cir. 1952).   
57 See id. 
58 See Loren, supra note 55, at 320. 
59 Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d at 598.   
60 The most analogous doctrine we have is the doctrine of limited abandonment, 
whose existence is questionable at best. As Loren points out, “[o]nly a handful 
of judicial opinions have addressed the possibility of a limited abandonment of 
copyright. . . . The cases merely cite to each other without any case offering a 
persuasive justification for barring limited abandonment.” Loren, supra note 55, 
at 321. But even this doctrine requires an overt act, which does not solve the 
orphan works problem. Id. at 322.  
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propose a doctrine to fill the void created by the intersection of changing 
copyright law and digital technology: the orphan theory of abandonment. 
II. THE ORPHAN THEORY OF ABANDONMENT 
¶24 The law of adverse possession promotes the free transferability of 
real and personal property.61 Intellectual property, however, has no 
concomitant. This should not be a surprise, because strictly applying 
adverse possession to intellectual property could cause disastrous results. 
But the policy behind adverse possession—that free transferability of 
property is a good thing—is certainly applicable to intellectual property. To 
bring the argument full circle, I contend that the orphaned theory of 
abandonment is justified by the following policy: that the law should 
promote the free transferability of intellectual property.  
¶25 The orphan theory of abandonment, which I refer to 
interchangeably as orphan abandonment, would be a two-stage defense. 
First, the infringer cannot raise the defense unless he has spent three years 
searching for the true copyright owner through the “reasonable exercise of 
due diligence.”62 Second, the consequence to the copyright owner of a 
successful orphan abandonment defense depends on when the suit was filed: 
if the copyright owner files suit within ten years of when he first knew or 
should have known of the infringement, then orphan abandonment is merely 
an affirmative defense to infringement; after that time, however, orphan 
abandonment would constitute a complete defense to validity. In its latter 
form, the orphan abandonment defense would produce the same results as a 
successful assertion of the original abandonment defense: the “exclusive 
rights” over the work lapse to the public domain.  
¶26 To prove orphan abandonment, a defendant should be required to 
show: 
1. The copyright is owned by an individual or entity that 
could not be identified in three years63  
2. through the reasonable exercise of due diligence. 
¶27 The orphan theory protects every conceivable interest64 while fixing 
a massive problem with contemporary copyright law. It plugs the hole left 
by the statute of limitations’ “continuing violation” theory65 by kicking in at 
                                                      
61 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 860 
(3d ed. 2000). 
62 See infra ¶ 26. 
63 The author’s proposal is for three years. However, any term of years that 
remedies the concerns raised supra ¶¶ 16–22 is sufficient.  
64 Namely, those of the author, industry, and the public.  
65 See supra ¶ 18.  
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the moment of the first infringing act. It also brings back a form of 
forfeiture without resurrecting the notice requirement—which is banned by 
the Berne Convention.66 Like fair use, the orphan theory of abandonment 
lets courts balance the unique facts of each case with the subjective element 
of “reasonable exercise of due diligence.” Finally, the orphan theory of 
abandonment allows the dissemination of works whose copyright has—but 
for the absence of some “overt act”— been abandoned.67 
¶28 The defense also contains many internal safeguards. For instance, to 
trigger the clock for orphan abandonment, it is not enough that the 
defendant infringe on the plaintiff’s copyright. Such activity could occur in 
the privacy of the defendant-infringer’s home where the plaintiff could 
never be reasonably expected to know of the defendant’s infringing 
conduct. Therefore, the clock does not start until the copyright owner 
should know of the infringing act “through the reasonable exercise of due 
diligence.”68 This occurs after the defendant conducts an exhaustive three-
year search for the true copyright owner.69 Only after that three-year period 
can a defendant infringe and seek refuge through the orphan abandonment 
defense. This is comparable to adverse possession, which requires the 
possessor to maintain continuous possession for a specific period of time.70 
In the case of orphan abandonment, the defendant must continuously search 
for three years before having a colorable orphan abandonment defense. The 
defendant cannot merely search for one month, wait thirty-five more, and 
then utilize the defense. Additionally, the “reasonable due diligence” 
requirement coupled with the ten-year delay between the first infringing act 
and when the copyrighted work lapses into the public domain protects a 
copyright owner from suffering inadvertent forfeiture. 
¶29 Moreover, the orphan theory of abandonment mitigates the 
monopoly problem while protecting the rights of copyright owners. After 
exercising three to ten years of due diligence, the defense protects only the 
defendant in that particular suit against infringement. But after ten years, the 
defense functions as a complete defense to validity, vesting the work in the 
public domain. This rule avoids the monopoly problem introduced at the 
beginning of this iBrief. 
¶30 Google—which is the subject of many contemporary monopoly 
concerns—was willing to suffer a nine-figure class action copyright 
infringement suit in order to get Google Books online. If the orphan theory 
                                                      
66 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2006); See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. 
L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
67 Loren, supra note 55, at 319–20. 
68 See supra ¶ 24–25.   
69 Id. 
70 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 62, at 859. 
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of abandonment did not treat defendants differently based on how hard they 
tried to find the copyright owner, then defendants like Google would reap a 
de facto copyright-like monopoly for simply being the first mover. At the 
same time, however, Google should have some incentive to be the first 
mover. Having a ten year period between when Google begins its 
exhaustive search for the copyright owner and when the work enters the 
public domain should be sufficient. This will give Google a head start but 
not an uncontestable monopoly.  
¶31 The elements of the orphan theory of abandonment also respond to 
and rectify the deficiencies of the contemporary defenses discussed in Part 
I.71 In particular, the defense fuses the continuity requirement of adverse 
possession (the three-year exhaustive search) with the overt act requirement 
(the reasonable exercise of due diligence) in copyright abandonment.  
¶32 This three-year requirement prevents copyright poachers from 
stripping a work of its copyright protection by simply waiting for a 
copyright owner to disappear (i.e., die, fall off the grid, etc.). 72  This 
requirement is similar to the adverse possession requirement of continuous 
possession. The adverse possessor must continuously possess the property 
throughout the statutory period. Similarly, a defendant cannot begin 
infringing, and then search for the copyright owner. Rather, the process is 
reversed: the defendant must first exercise reasonable due diligence to find 
the copyright owner for three years. Only after that period may a defendant 
employ this proposed defense to copyright infringement.  
¶33 The second element dovetails with the first: it requires that the 
defendant search for the copyright owner and fail, despite his “reasonable 
exercise of due diligence.” Although it is a higher standard than good faith, 
it does not require the defendant to expend every possible resource in his 
search. Rather, the defendant need only expend resources commensurate 
with the value of the work for which he sought a license.  
¶34 Economic standards like these are not new to copyright law. Courts 
frequently employ a market-based analysis under the fair use defense’s 
fourth factor, which focuses on the potential market for the work.73 The 
analysis for this element of orphan abandonment is not much different: 
When the market for the work is strong, the defendant should invest 
significant resources to find the copyright owner before the orphan 
abandonment defense should apply. Conversely, when the market for the 
work is virtually non-existent, the defendant should not be expected to 
spend millions of dollars in order to find the copyright owner.  
                                                      
71 See supra Part I. 
72 See supra ¶¶ 24–25. 
73 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
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¶35 Concededly, other methods could work to rectify the orphan works 
problem without broadening the scope of the abandonment doctrine.74 Such 
methods include a stricter registration system or a different interpretation of 
the statute of limitation triggers. Both of these approaches, however, have 
significant flaws. For example, if the United States adopted a stricter 
registration system, it would likely run afoul of its obligations under the 
Berne Convention.  
¶36 More moderate thinkers who reject the orphan theory as too harsh 
would prefer to modify the statute of limitation triggers. The problem with 
this approach, however, is that the statute of limitations only provides a 
defense to infringement; it does not act as a complete bar to validity. 
Altering the statute of limitations, therefore, does not solve the monopoly 
problem because the statute of limitations shuts out second infringers. In 
other words, let us say that Google is infringing with its Google Books 
program and successfully runs the statute of limitations for ten years—
seven years longer than is necessary under current law. Let us further 
assume that the publisher of the infringed work sues Google for 
infringement and loses on statute of limitations grounds. If a competitor, let 
us say Amazon, wants to do the same thing, the statute of limitations as to 
Amazon starts at the moment Amazon starts infringing, which may be long 
after Google is already online disseminating the works in question. Thus, 
Google’s acts will be considered non-infringing but Amazon will be 
deemed an infringer because the statute only begins to run once Amazon 
starts infringing. The orphan theory solves this problem by forfeiting the 
copyright owner’s work to the public domain after ten years. This forfeiture 
is necessary to mitigate the monopoly harm that exists under either the 
status quo or under a system with different statute of limitations triggers. 
CONCLUSION 
¶37 Admittedly, it is not likely that an orphan theory of abandonment 
will gain traction in the United States because of the country’s adherence to 
the Berne Convention.75 However, there is nothing in the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act that specifically bars the defense. To the contrary, 
section 3 of the BCIA provides,  
The provisions of the Berne Convention shall be given effect under 
title 17, as amended by this Act, and any other relevant provision of 
Federal or State law, including the common law; and shall not be 
                                                      
74 But see Loren, supra note 55 (proposing a similar defense: limited 
abandonment).  
75 Loren, supra note 55, at 323 (“The Copyright Act today, as well as 
international treaties concerning copyright law, make[s] it impossible to 
inadvertently lose copyright protection.”).  
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enforceable in any action brought pursuant to the provisions of the 
Berne Convention itself.76 
¶38 The size and scope of the orphan works problem is still not fully 
understood. With more than a century of copyright protection for most 
works, it is doubtful that the problem is a small one. The confluence of 
digital technology, extended copyright terms, and international 
harmonization requires legislators and judges alike to rethink the limits of 
copyright protection. Under present law, works that have been all but 
abandoned receive full copyright protection. This paradigm benefits no one. 
Perhaps this proposal, in addition to others, will ignite a much needed 
debate within the judiciary on the status of orphan works. 
 
                                                      
76 Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
(1988) (emphasis added).  
